Schneier on Security: Post-Underwear-Bomber Airport Security

November 16, 2010

Regarding the TSA nonsense, Bruce Schneier wrote in January:

Its magical thinking: If we defend against what the terrorists did last time, well somehow defend against what they do next time. Of course this doesnt work. We take away guns and bombs, so the terrorists use box cutters. We take away box cutters and corkscrews, and the terrorists hide explosives in their shoes. We screen shoes, they use liquids. We limit liquids, they sew PETN into their underwear. We implement full-body scanners, and theyre going to do something else. This is a stupid game; we should stop playing it.

via Schneier on Security: Post-Underwear-Bomber Airport Security. And even more importantly:

Finally, we need to be indomitable. The real security failure on Christmas Day was in our reaction. We're reacting out of fear, wasting money on the story rather than securing ourselves against the threat. Abdulmutallab succeeded in causing terror even though his attack failed.